Abstract. The secret key of a forward-secure signature scheme evolves at regular intervals, but the public key is fixed during the lifetime of the system. This paper enhances the security of Abdalla and Reyzin's forward-secure signature scheme via threshold and proactive mechanisms. In our threshold forward-secure signature scheme, we combine multiplicative and polynomial secret sharing schemes to form a threshold forward-secure signature scheme. We develop a special proof system to prove robustness of our scheme.
Introduction
Proactive cryptography combines the concepts of "distributing the secret" and "refreshing the shares" to provide security against the mobile adversary, who attacks the parties of a distributed cryptosystem dynamically. For an adversary, we cannot assume that it cannot break into a particular party, who holds a share of the secret, during the party's lifetime. However, we can assume that the adversary can break into at most t parties during a short period of time, say an hour. Based on this observation, the proactive cryptography "refreshes" each party's share periodically. It divides the time into time periods, starting at 0. At the end of each time period, there is a "refresh phase" during which each party refreshes its share, but the secret they share remains intact. We assume that the mobile adversary can corrupt all parties during the lifetime of the cryptosystem; nevertheless, it can corrupt at most t parties during a time period. The proactive mechanism provides a high level of security for cryptosystems so that we would like to proactivize important cryptographic primitives.
In this paper we are interested in proactivizing the forward-secure signature scheme of Abadalla and Reyzin [3] . The Abadalla and Reyzin's forwardsecure signature scheme (See Appendix) is an improvement of the Bellare-Miner scheme [5] with a shorter public key. Abadalla, et. al. has proactivized the Bellare-Miner forward-secure signature scheme [2] . They proposed two threshold signature schemes in proactivizing Bellare-Miner forward-secure signature scheme. One scheme uses multiplicative secret sharing and the other uses polynomial secret sharing. In our scheme, we combine both secret sharing schemes for efficiency. We use multiplicative secret sharing in signing a message in threshold and polynomial secret sharing in sharing the signing secret. Our scheme is not only robust, but also efficient.
It is worth mentioning that we propose a new scheme for multiplying two secrets that are shared among parties [4, 7, 17] . Our multiplication scheme is efficient since it uses the public channel and the private channel once only.
Preliminaries
Communication model. We assume that the involved n parties are connected by a broadcast channel such that the messages over the channel cannot be blocked, delayed or altered. Nevertheless, one can inject false messages. Any two parties are connected by a private channel such that a third party cannot get messages sent over the private channel. We also assume that the communication channel is synchronous by rounds, that is, all parties send messages simultaneously in a round.
Time. There is a universal clock such that each party knows the absolute time. Therefore, we can divide time into time periods, starting at 0. Each time period has two phases: the execution phase and the refresh phase. The refresh phase follows the execution phase. The parties sign messages during the execution phase. During the refresh phase, all parties together run the share refresh algorithm to refresh their shares.
Adversary. We consider the static adversary who chooses corrupted parties at the beginning of each time period. The adversary runs three phases: the chosen message attack phase (cma), the break-in phase (breakin), and the forgery phase (forge). The breakin phase for the threshold signature scheme is equivalent to the overthreshold phase of [2] .
In the cma phase, the adversary can corrupt at most t parties for any period of time. The adversary gets all information in the corrupted parties, including their shares, random bits, etc. The adversary can query the signing oracle S x , where x is the secret signing key. Since we assume the random oracle model [6] , the adversary is allowed to query the random oracle H corresponding to the collision-resistant hash function used in the scheme. At the end of the cma phase, the adversary can stay in the current phase or enter the next breakin phase. In the breakin phase, the adversary can corrupt more than t parties. Let c be the period that the adversary enters the breakin phase and corrupts more than t users. In this phase, the adversary can compute the master secret (the signing key) of period c from the shares of corrupted parties. Then, the adversary enters the forge phase, during which the adversary outputs a forged signature of a new message which has not been queried to the signing oracle. We say that the adversary succeeds in attacking the scheme if it outputs a forged signature for a prior time period c , c < c, with non-negligible probability.
Forward security. A signature in the basic signature scheme is independent of time. Once the secret signing key is exposed, one can sign arbitrary messages. For forward-secure signature, the signing key evolves along time periods. At time period j, the signing key is SK j . In the next time period j + 1, the signing key is updated to SK j+1 and SK j is deleted immediately. Although, the signing key evolves, the public key is the same for the whole lifetime. If one gets the signing key SK c of time period c, he can fake the signatures of later time periods, but cannot fake the signatures of earlier time periods. Bellare and Miner [5] proposed the first forward-secure signature scheme based on difficulty of computing the square roots modulus a Blum integer. The scheme is actually converted from Fiat and Shamir's identification scheme [13] . To achieve security strength of level l, their scheme uses l public keys and l secret keys. Later, Abdalla and Reyzin [3] proposed an improvement based on the 2 l -th root problem [16, 21, 23, 22] . With the same level of security strength, their scheme uses one public key and one secret key only.
Proactive security. Ostrovsky and Yung [24] proposed proactive security for distributed cryptographic schemes to deter mobile adversaries. For proactive security, the share in each party is refreshed at the end of each time period, but the signing secret key the parties share is unchanged at all time. A proactive cryptosystem remains secure as long as the adversary does not corrupt more than t parties in each time period. The shares of corrupted parties become useless when time enters the next time period. There is much literature about proactive cryptosystems [1, 14, 15, 19, 18, 10, 11, 25, 12] .
Building Blocks
The following system setting is used throughout the rest of the paper.
-Let p=4p q + 1 be a prime, where p and q are large primes and p ≡ q ≡ 3 (mod 4). -Let N = p q and g a generator of the order-N subgroup of Z * p . All operations hereafter will be over the order-N subgroup, unless stated otherwise.
(t, n)-VSS procedure. If dealer D i wants to share a random secret with other dealers, it runs the following steps. 
Select a random polynomial
If the verification fails,
Recovery procedure. We use Lagrange's interpolation method to recover the secret with at least t + 1 shares.
Proof-SS procedure. Given (g, t, N, F, T ), prover P wants to convince verifier V two things: (1) a = log g F mod p = T 1/t mod N and (2) it knows this a. This is a combination of proofs of membership and knowledge. We use Proof-SS(g, t, g a , a t ) to denote the above interactive proof system.
Theorem 1. Proof-SS is complete, sound and zero-knowledge.
Proof. (Sketch) The completeness property can be verified easily. For soundness of proof of knowledge, if any prover P * can convince V with a non-negligible probability , P * and V together can compute a with an overwhelming probability. By a probabilistic argument, there is a set W of w's of probability /2 such that for every w ∈ W , P * can answer two different challenges c 1 and c 2 with probability /2. Therefore, we can get two responses r 1 = a c1 w mod N and r 2 = a c2 w mod N for the same commitments H and B. We can compute a = r 2 /r 1 mod N assuming, without loss of generality, c 1 = 0 and c 2 = 1. For soundness of proof of membership, we can easily show that if F and T are not of right form, the probability that P * can cheat V is 0.5 (and is negligible after a polynomial number of rounds.)
For zero-knowledge, we construct a simulator S to simulate the view of any verifier V * . S first selects c ∈ {0, 1} and r ∈ Z * N randomly and computes H = F We convert Proof-SS into a non-interactive version by using a collisionresistant hash function H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} l to replace V [9] , where l be the security parameter. The message (c, r 1 , · · · , r l ) sent by P for non-interactive Proof-SS, denoted by NIProof-SS, satisfies
where || is the concatenation operator of strings. Let c i denote the i-th bit of c. If
, and setting r i = a ci w i mod N . NIProof-SS releases no useful information under the random oracle model assuming hardness of discrete logarithm and factoring.
Proof-DH proceture. Given (g, H, F ) and the prover P wants to convince V that H = g s and F = g s 2 are of right form and it knows the secret s. The interactive proof system is as follows [8] .
1. P randomly selects w ∈ Z * N and sends A = g w and
The above Proof-DH procedure is complete, sound, and zero knowledge. We use NIProof-DH to denote its non-interactive version.
SQ procedure. Let h(x) be a degree-t polynomial over Z * N with h(0) = s and shared by the dealers D i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n. SQ's goal is to make the dealers share a degree-t polynomial h (x) over Z * N with h (0) = s 2 mod N . SQ procedure is as follows.
Dealer
2 ) and checks validity of the published values of other deal-
. . , g At , computed from the verification values of f i (x)'s, are the verification values of F (x).
Each dealer
We use SQ(C, h(x), h (x)) to denote the above procedure, where C is the dealer set, h(x) is the shared polynomial initially and h (x) is the shared polynomial at the end. Proof. (Sketch) We can check correctness easily. Since there are at most t corrupted dealers, t < n/3, honest dealers can smoothly finish the procedure. This is guaranteed by the (t, n)-VSS procedure.
We present a simulator to show that a malicious adversary, who corrupts at most t dealers, gets no information. Let B be the corrupted set of dealers.
and simulate NIProof-DH(g, g
The above simulation produces a distribution computationally indistinguishable from that of the real run. ✷ Assume that the dealers share two degree-t polynomial h 1 (x) and h 2 (x) initially. We can modify the SQ procedure so that the dealers share a degree-t polynomial h (x) whose constant coefficient is h 1 (0)h 2 (0) mod N at the end. Let Mult(C, h 1 (x), h 2 (x), h (x)) denote the procedure of sharing a degree-t polynomial h (x) whose constant coefficient is h 1 (0)h 2 (0) mod N .
Our Threshold Forward-Secure Signature Scheme
Our threshold forward-secure signature scheme, denoted by TFSS, is a keyevolving (t, s, n)-threshold signature scheme that consists of four procedures: TFSS.key, TFSS.update, TFSS.sign, and TFSS.verify, where t is the maximum number of corrupted dealers, s is the minimum number of alive dealers so that signature computation is possible, and n is the total number of dealers. In our scheme, we set s = t + 1 and n ≥ 2t + 1. There is a manager presiding the scheme.
TFSS.key: it generates the public key and each dealer D i 's initial secret-key share S i,0 and public-key share P K i,0 at time period 0.
1. Select N as that in the system setting. TFSS.update: at the end of time period j, each dealer updates its secret-key and public-key shares from S i,j and P K i,j to S i,j+1 and P K i,j+1 . − 1 numbers s i,1 , s i,2 , . . . , s i,n−1 over Z * N and computes 
The manager randomly selects S
i,0 ∈ Z * N , 1 ≤ i ≤ n and sets U i,0 = 1/S 2 l(T +1) i,0 mod N , S 0 = n i=1 S i,
Each dealer D i randomly selects n
s i,n = S i,j / n−1 k=1 s i,k mod N . 2. Each dealer D i sends s i,k to D k privately and publishesŝ i,k = 1/s 2 l(T +1−j) i,k mod N , 1 ≤ k ≤ n.
Each dealer D k checks validity of the published values by
U i,j = n r=1ŝ i,r mod N , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, i = k. Dealer D k also
Security Analysis
In this section, we show the correctness and security of our proposed scheme.
Theorem 3 (Correctness).
Assume that SK j = (N, T, j, S j ) and P K = (N, U, T ) are key pairs of the system at time period j. Each dealer D i holds the secret-key share SK i,j = (N, T, j, S i,j ) and public-key share , σ) is generated by TFSS.sign for M , TFSS.verify(P K, j, Z, σ)) = 1.
Proof.
We have
Theorem 4. TFSS.update procedure is secure against malicious adversaries.
Proof. (Sketch) We construct a simulator S to simulate TFSS.update procedure assuming existence of malicious adversaries. Let B = {D b1 , . . . , D bt } be the set of corrupted servers at current time j. For simplicity, the secrets of corrupted dealers are treated as inputs. S simulates each dealer D i 's behavior as follows.
The TFSS scheme is a key-evolving (t, s, n)-threshold signature scheme for s = t + 1 and n = 2t + 1.
Proof. (Sketch) Since there are at most t corrupted servers, their secret-key shares are not sufficient to recover the secret-key shares of honest dealers. The others follow the scheme. ✷ Theorem 6 (Forward secrecy). Let FS-DS denote the single-user signature scheme in [3] . TFSS is a threshold forward-secure signature scheme as long as FS-DS is a forward-secure signature scheme in the single-user sense.
Proof. (Sketch) Let F be the adversary who attacks TFSS successfully by forging a signature (c , Z, α). We construct an algorithm that uses this F to forge a signature for the single-user FS-DS. As stated at Section 2, the attacking procedure contains three phases: cma, breakin, and forge. Our algorithm can query from the two oracles: the hashing oracle H and the singing oracle S.
In the cma phase, F guesses a particular time period c during which F breaks more than t dealers and gets the secret S c . Let
and compute public-key share
We simulate F by choosing a random tape for F , feeding all public keys to F , and running F in the cma phase. F can corrupt at most t dealers except the time period c. Since F can corrupt at most t dealers except at time period c, we simply give all necessary secret-key shares and exchanged shares as F 's input. F decides either to stay at the cma phase or to switch to the breakin phase, and then enter the forge phase.
We now we simulate the views of corrupted dealers during the key update phase. Let B = {D b1 , · · · , D bt } be the set of corrupted dealers at time period j. The simulation is the same as that of Theorem 4, which simulates the key update procedure. Note that the set of corrupted servers is decided in advance.
We can simulate the hash and signing oracles of F . For each query (j, Y, M ) made by F , we query H on the same input and return the answer to F . We simulate the signing oracle of F by using S. Let M be the message queried to S. We give the direct answer (j, Z, σ) of S to F . Now, we simulate F 's view of the signing procedure. The input consists all secrets of the corrupted dealers and public information. For the input M and its signature (j, Z, σ)) seen by F , we construct the same probability distribution of F 's real view as follows.
For
Then, we simulate (t, n)-VSS procedure to share R i with other dealers. Furthermore, we computes the partial signature
we computes its partial signature as follows.
) and run (t, n)-VSS procedure to share R ci , 1 ≤ i ≤ n − t, with other dealers.
Finally, we compute
We can show that the above simulated view is statistically indistinguishable from the real view.
Obtaining a forgery. Let c be the time period that F switches to the breakin phase. We provide the secret key S c to F and run F to output a forged signature (c , Z, α) for M , where c < c. (c , Z, α) is the forged signature for the single-user FS-DS, which is a contradiction. Therefore, our TFSS is secure. ✷
Discussion
Proactive security. We can easily add the proactive mechanism to TFSS.update. The only difference is to computeŝ i,k = 1/s New construction. We can use polynomial secret sharing in our scheme, though it is less efficient. Our new construction is as follows. Initial setting is a bit different from that in Section 4. Let f (x) be a degree-t polynomial with f (0) = S 0 and shared by all dealers by (t, n)-VSS procedure. To update the key S j to S j+1 , all dealers compute the multiplication of two secrets for l times, where l is the security parameter. The robustness property is achieved by our Mult procedure. Mult procedure uses a proof to show that a dealer is honest. To compute a signature for a message, all dealers compute l(T + 1 − j) + log 2 σ times of distributed multiplication of secrets for Y = R Efficiency. In our new construction based on polynomial secret sharing, dealers perform l multiplications of shares to update the key. That is, they exchange messages l times and compute l proofs for Mult procedure. To compute a signature, dealers exchange l(T + 1 − j) + log 2 σ messages and compute l(T + 1 − j) + log 2 σ proofs. As we can see, the computation and communication costs are quite expensive.
In our main scheme in Section 4, we combine the techniques of polynomial secret sharing and multiplicative secret sharing to reduce the cost. Each dealer exchanges messages twice in the key update stage, and once in the signing message stage. Each dealer needs to compute one proof in both key update and signing message stages. Therefore, our main scheme is quite efficient.
Conclusion
We have proposed a threshold forward-secure signature scheme, which is based on the 2 l -th root problem. Our scheme is robust and efficient in terms of the number of rounds so that the amount of exchanged messages among dealers is low. We show forward-secure security of our scheme based on that of the singleuser scheme.
